

FEDERPRIVACY



PRIVACY DAY FORUM 2023

Protezione dei dati personali inclusiva e sviluppo sostenibile della società digitale

CNR Area della Ricerca di Pisa, 25 maggio 2023



Consiglio Nazionale
delle Ricerche
Area Territoriale di Ricerca di Pisa

Il lato oscuro dell'Internet of Things

Domenico Laforenza


Ricercatore Emerito Associato

Istituto di Informatica e Telematica, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Pisa



Scena tratta da:
«Accadde in una casa
intelligente....»






ssss...ma lo sai che la settimana scorsa i padroni sono andati in vacanza?

Ah, ecco perchè non li “vedevo” più.... Immagino che te l'abbia detto quella spiona della webcam?





Ma perchè danno sempre la colpa a me? Io l'ho saputo dallo smartphone che l'ha appreso da Facebook!



Webcam

INTERNET





2a00:1620:c0:60:aa20:66ff:fe27:c47f

“Una rete a dimensione mondiale di “oggetti” interconnessi, indirizzabili univocamente mediante protocolli standard di comunicazione

TCP/IP





74/135 Withings Stell HR L'orologio analogico che monitora il battito cardiaco (foto: Milo Sciaky)



Le «cose»



Dispositivi connessi (*≈ 30 G nel 2030*)

- termostati
- lampadine intelligenti
- prese elettriche intelligenti
- sistemi di intrattenimento (stereo, TV,..)
- assistenti personali
- telecamere di sicurezza e rilevatori di movimento
- rilevatori di fumo
- campanelli video e serrature intelligenti
- elettrodomestici (frigorifero, aspirapolvere, ecc.)
- giocattoli e localizzatori per bambini
- webcam per controllare bambini o animali domestici
- mangiatoie intelligenti per animali domestici
-





WIKIPEDIA
The Free Encyclopedia

Main page
Contents
Featured content
Current events
Random article
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Interaction

Help
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Community portal
Recent changes
Contact page

Tools

What links here
Related changes
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Special pages
Permanent link
Page information
Wikidata item
Cite this page

Not logged in Talk Contributions Create account Log in

Article Talk

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Kevin Ashton

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Kevin Ashton (born 1968) is a [British](#) technology pioneer who cofounded the [Auto-ID Center](#) at the [Massachusetts Institute of Technology](#) (MIT), which created a global standard system for [RFID](#) and other sensors.^[1] He is known for coining the term "the [Internet of Things](#)" to describe a system where the Internet is connected to the physical world via ubiquitous sensors.^{[2][3]}

Ashton was born in [Birmingham](#), UK. He read Scandinavian Studies at [University College London](#) from 1990 to 1994. He was working as an assistant brand manager at [Procter & Gamble](#) (P&G) in 1997 when he became interested in using RFID to help manage P&G's [supply chain](#).^[1] This work led him to MIT, where he helped start an RFID research consortium called the Auto-ID Center with professors [Sanjay Sarma](#) and Sunny Siu and researcher David Brock. The center opened in 1999 as an industry sponsored research project with the goal of creating a global open standard system to put RFID everywhere. Ashton was the Center's Executive Director. Siu, then Sarma, acted as Research Director, later Chairman of Research. Under Ashton and Sarma's leadership, the number of sponsors grew to 103, and additional labs were funded at other major universities around the world. Once the system was developed, MIT licensed it to not-for-profit standards body [GS1](#) and the project reached a successful conclusion. The labs were renamed [Auto-ID Labs](#) and continue their research.

Ashton became a high-tech entrepreneur with start-ups ThingMagic,^[4] cleantech company [EnerNOC](#) (NASDAQ:ENOC) and Zensi, an energy sensing company he founded with [Shwetak Patel](#) among others. Zensi was acquired by [Belkin International](#) in April 2010.^[5] Ashton then developed and launched the [Belkin WeMo](#) home automation system. He writes for [RFID Journal](#), Medium and Quartz, and published a book, *How to Fly a Horse* with [Random House](#) in 2015. In January 2016, *How to Fly a Horse* won "Best Business Book" from 1-800-CEO-READ.

For an April 2013 Quartz article Ashton created *Santiago Swallow*, a fictional [Mexican social media](#) guru who specializes in the "imagined self", the fictional expert was furnished with 90,000 paid-for [Twitter](#) followers and a Wikipedia biography. The creation of Swallow is an attempt to show that credibility is unrelated to having a large number of Twitter followers.^[6]

References [edit]

Kevin Ashton



Ashton at the 2015 Texas Book Festival.

Born	1968 Birmingham, England
Nationality	British

Internet of Things, coniata nel **1999** dal ricercatore britannico [Kevin Ashton](#) per indicare la possibilità di collegare a Internet qualunque «oggetto» o «dispositivo dotato di sensori»

Casa intelligente (Smart Home)

Gestione in automatico e/o da remoto degli impianti e degli oggetti connessi dell'abitazione




- **Obiettivi:**
- ridurre i consumi energetici
- migliorare il comfort
- sicurezza dell'abitazione e delle persone al suo interno



Città intelligente (Smart City)

Monitoraggio e gestione degli elementi di una città e per migliorarne vivibilità, sostenibilità e competitività



Esempi:

- mezzi per il trasporto pubblico
- illuminazione pubblica
- parcheggi
- smaltimento rifiuti
- inclusione e partecipazione sociale

Auto intelligente (Smart Car)

Auto connesse: comunicare informazioni in tempo reale al consumatore, interazione tra veicoli e con l'infrastruttura circostante: guida più sicura, prevenzione di incidenti




<https://www.lagenziadiviaggi.it/auto-intelligenti-inaugurata-la-sezione-digital-di-aniasa/>



Agricoltura intelligente (Smart Agriculture)

Monitoraggio di parametri micro-climatici a supporto dell'agricoltura: migliorare la qualità dei prodotti, ridurre le risorse utilizzate e l'impatto ambientale




<https://www.agendadigitale.eu/industry-4-0/smart-agricolture-che-cosa-serve-allitalia-il-quadro/>



Industrial IoT (IoT per l'Industria 4.0)


Adozione di sistemi «cyber-fisici»: connessione dei macchinari, degli operatori e dei prodotti per abilitare nuove logiche di gestione della produzione




<https://www.agendadigitale.eu/infrastrutture/industrial-iot-come-saa-nel-breve-termine/>



Dispositivi IoT in Sanità




Modello di interazione tra un soggetto e l'ecosistema IoT circostante



Potenziali punti di attacco alla privacy

Come proteggere la nostra sicurezza/privacy dall'invasione dei nuovi «popoli nomadi»?

La Valle della sicurezza e della privacy



La superficie di attacco si espande a dismisura....

Privacy e Security


Due facce della stessa medaglia



Privacy e sicurezza delle persone sotto attacco...

Internet delle «cose» (IoT)

Social Media



Privacy
Sicurezza

Intelligenza Artificiale

Big Data



Privacy: Protezione “by Laws”

- Esempi:

- General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
 - Regolamento 2016/679 UE (25 maggio 2018)
- Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPS)
- Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
-



Correva l'anno 2015.....



FTC Staff Report

JANUARY 2015

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Benefits.....	7
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Conclusion

The IoT presents numerous benefits to consumers, and has the potential to change the ways that consumers interact with technology in fundamental ways. In the future, the Internet of Things is likely to meld the virtual and physical worlds together in ways that are currently difficult to comprehend. From a security and privacy perspective, the predicted pervasive introduction of sensors and devices into currently intimate spaces – such as the home, the car, and with wearables and ingestibles, even the body – poses particular challenges. As physical objects in our everyday lives increasingly detect and share observations about us, consumers will likely continue to want privacy. The Commission staff will continue to enforce laws, educate consumers and businesses, and engage with consumer advocates, industry, academics, and other stakeholders involved in the IoT to promote appropriate security and privacy protections. At the same time, we urge further self-regulatory efforts on IoT, along with enactment of data security and broad-based privacy legislation.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR SECURING THE INTERNET OF THINGS (IoT)

November 2016

Version 1.0
November 15, 2016



Homeland
Security

NISTIR 8228

Considerations for Managing Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks

Katie Boeckl
Michael Fagan
William Fisher
Naomi Lefkowitz
Katerina N. Megas
Ellen Nadeau
Danna Gabel O'Rourke
Ben Piccarreta
Karen Scarfone

This publication is available free of charge from:
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8228>

June 2019

NIST
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

CAREFUL CONNECTIONS

Keeping the Internet of Things Secure



September 2020



Federal Trade Commission | business.ftc.gov



EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY
FOR CYBERSECURITY



SECURING THE INTERNET OF THINGS

Secure supply chain for IoT

NOVEMBER 2020

November 2020

<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/guidelines-for-securing-the-internet-of-things/@@download/fullReport>

ENISA Threat Landscape 15 Top Threats in 2020



EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY
FOR CYBERSECURITY




www.enisa.europa.eu

For more information: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/etl>



IoT: Sicurezza e Privacy



<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/iot-and-smart-infrastructures/iot/good-practices-for-iot-and-smart-infrastructures-tool>

MARCH 2023



ENISA THREAT LANDSCAPE 2022

(July 2021 to July 2022)

OCTOBER 2022

Minacce

1. Ransomware
2. Malware
3. Social Engineering
4. Threats against data
5. Threats against availability: Denial of Service
6. Threats against availability: Internet threats
7. Disinformation – misinformation
8. Supply-chain attacks



Figure 1: ENISA Threat Landscape 2022 - Prime threats



4.1.2 Malware re targeting IoT almost doubles (pp.)

- IoT malware has increased over 2021. The change in the first half of 2022 shows the prevalence of IoT targeting malware almost doubling.
- In the first 6 months of 2022, the attack volume is already higher than had been recorded over the last 4 years.
- Research shows that in the first months of 2022, Mirai botnets were responsible for most attacks, quantified to more than 7 million attacks.
- Mozi, another large botnet, has grown slightly since Q3 2021 and was detected more than 5 million times




7.1.2 DDoS attacks are increasingly moving towards mobile networks and IoT

- (IoT) Devices are simple to corrupt, often coming with misconfigurations (e.g. weak passwords)
- At the same time, the increasing complexity of these mobile systems make users' shortage of security skills increasingly relevant
- DDoS attacks were often launched from compromised servers or consumer devices, such as IoT products and broadband routers



Architettura IoT

Applicazione



Rete



Fisico



Potenziali vulnerabilità

Applicazione



Rete




Fisico



- Scarsa sicurezza fisica
- Autenticazione/autorizzazione debole
- Password deboli o settate dal costruttore e mai cambiate dall'utente
- Comunicazioni «in chiaro» (non crittografate)
- Firmware instabile
- Servizi di rete insicuri
- Software insicuro
- Porte aperte, anche se non necessarie
- Componenti insicure o obsolete
-



Processo di gestione delle vulnerabilità



E' possibile scoprire le «cose» collegate in Internet?



D. Laforenza, [Internet of Things e Big Data](#), Corso DPO,
FederPrivacy, 20 novembre 2019



Cos'è Shodan?

- è un motore di ricerca per estrarre informazioni sui dispositivi IoT connessi a Internet
- Classifica le informazioni critiche su vari dispositivi IoT trovati in rete:
 - Telecamere (ad es. CCTV, webcam, baby monitor, ...)
 - Router e dispositivi di comunicazione
 - Industrial control systems (ICS)
 - SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
 - PLC (Programmable Logic Controller)
 - DCS (Distributed Control System)
 -



Popular Tags

webcam

cam

camera

ip

router

scada

ftp

server

http

iot

test

password

cisco

web

default

login

ssh

1

nas

ipcam

Come funziona Shodan?

- Esegue la scansione di Internet usando gli indirizzi IP
 - Indicizza tutte le informazioni ricevute da questi IP
 - L'unità di base dei dati raccolti da Shodan è il **banner**
 - informazioni testuali che descrivono un servizio su un dispositivo
 - Il contenuto del banner varia notevolmente a seconda del tipo di servizio

Indirizzo IP

ellotel.net

HelloTel

Telecomunicazioni srl

 Italy, Frosinone

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Server: VCS-VideoJet-Webserver

Connection: keep-alive

Content-Type: text/html

Etag: "VJ-15-56500410-537e6590"

Accept-Ranges: bytes

Content-Length: 2330

Date: Tue May 16 12:56:33 2023 GMT

Last-Modified: Tue May 2 14:41:57 2023 GMT

Set-Cookie: HcsoB=704610401a5b032b; path=/;



Come funziona Shodan?

- Oltre al banner vengono recuperate informazioni sui metadati dei dispositivi che includono:
 - Nome dispositivo
 - Indirizzo IP
 - Posizione: paese, città o qualsiasi altro identificatore geografico in cui si trova il dispositivo
 - Organizzazione di appartenenza
 - Porte
 - Login e password predefiniti
 - Servizi e software in esecuzione sul dispositivo
 - Marca e modello tecnologie web adottate
 -



2023

Dashboard

Getting Started

- What is Shodan?
- Search Query Fundamentals
- Working with Shodan Data Files

LEARN MORE

>_ ASCII Videos

- Setting up Real-Time Network Monitoring
- Measuring Public SMB Exposure
- Analyzing the Vulnerabilities for a Network

VISIT THE CHANNEL

</> Developer Access

- How to Download Data with the API
- Looking up IP Information
- Working with Shodan Data Files

DEVELOPER PORTAL

Explore

Filtro

// CATEGORIES



// RESEARCH

Shodan 2000

Explore the Internet in style using an 80's retro-futuristic interface to synthwave music.

2000.SHODAN.IO

// BROWSE SEARCH DIRECTORY

Search shared queries...

Popular Tags

webcam cam camera ip router scada
ftp server http iot test password cisco
web default login ssh 1 nas incam

Job Board

Websites that advertise jobs via HTTP head...

hiring

Ethereum Miners

Devices that are mining the Ethereum crypt...

Filtro: `screenshot.label:webcam`

Shodan Maps Images Monitor Developer More...


SHODAN Explore Downloads Pricing `screenshot.label:webcam` Account

Facet Analysis

`screenshot.label:webcam` country


72.540 Webcam

// TOTAL: 72,540






// FOUND 74,444 RESULTS





// FOUND 74,444 RESULTS





AVVERTENZA: non è detto che le webcam «aperte» costituiscano un problema di privacy

- i legittimi utilizzatori, per molteplici interessi personali, potrebbero avere intenzionalmente fatto in modo che le webcam siano accessibili da chiunque/dovunque



TOTAL RESULTS

1,871

TOP CITIES

Milan	218
Rome	194
Naples	93
Turin	51
Veneto	51

More...

TOP PORTS

554	821
80	214
81	64
8080	55
82	43

More...

TOP ORGANIZATIONS

Telecom Italia S.p.A.	402
-----------------------	-----

View Report Browse Images View on Map

Product Spotlight: Free, Fast IP Lookups for Open Ports and Vulnerabilities using [InternetDB](#)

151.33.69.145 2023-05-16T12:00:51.639394
 ppp-145-69.33-151.wind.it
[WIND TRE S.P.A.](#)
 Italy, Turin
 RTSP/1.0 200 OK
 CSeq: 1
 Server: Hipcam RealServer/V1.0
 Public: OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, SET_PARAMETER, GET_PARAMETER

95.169.71.161 2023-05-16T11:56:33.250218
 host161-static.71.169.95.h
 ellotel.net
[HelloTel](#)
[Telecomunicazioni srl](#)
 Italy, Frosinone
 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 Server: VCS-VideoJet-Webserver
 Connection: keep-alive
 Content-Type: text/html
 Etag: "VJ-15-56500410-537e6590"
 Accept-Ranges: bytes
 Content-Length: 2330
 Date: Tue May 16 12:56:33 2023 GMT
 Last-Modified: Tue May 2 14:41:57 2023 GMT
 Set-Cookie: HcsoB=704610401a5b032b; path=/;

151.81.2.166 2023-05-16T11:41:38.566588
 Wind telecomunicazioni
 Italy, Dalmine
 RTSP/1.0 200 OK
 Server: TWT RTSP Server/1.0.0
 CSeq: 1
 Public: OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, GET_PARAMETER, SET_PARAMETER



Cliccandoci sopra



Shodan Maps Images Monitor Developer More...

Giulianello Rocca ... Fibreno Alvito ... Fontechiari ... Gallinaro ... Cori ... Montelanico Gorga ... Caserta Stazione ... Frosinone ... Torre ... Ripi ... Fontana Liri ... Santopadre ... Patrica ... Strangolagalli ...

SHODAN Explore Downloads Pricing Search... Account

95.169.71.161 Regular View Raw Data

© OpenMapTiles Satellite | © MapTiler © OpenStreetMap contributors

// TAGS: self-signed

// LAST SEEN: 2023-05-16

General Information

Hostnames **host161-static.71.169.95.hellotel.net**

Domains **HELLOTEL.NET**

Country **Italy**


City **Frosinone**

Organization **HelloTel Telecomunicazioni srl**

ISP **HelloTel Telecomunicazioni srl**

ASN **AS206539**

Open Ports



// 22 / TCP

-769175449 | 2023-04-24T15:30:50.998592

Dropbear sshd 2017.75

```
SSH-2.0-dropbear_2017.75
Key type: ssh-rsa
Key: AAAAB3NzaClyc2EAAAADAQABAAQCLNrh4sBKA6P09FCJhj5LUFHtiB1BkVFmp7qt730X2Sp2n
lqTrbquBne8ai6lboomGhQzBMOSImdyuQscY10GSvWXRJARSkG+7+OHRvHgyEiqCn05J1mkbG8XM
/8zWfnl19wjGbtZxrsd7jVuCvs1SnWkSTjKC3ztXLT9sU1Wz2dfMQoJ7zbnOd5JkWeTnZ9rWjdG4
crg6GBD7Hf4giEdTvU7yzalcoT04gxcEqBB8Xa0gV7TD+8sgpD/aGybaZD2Xnla7implemmPGx8
TKpPpyXrmRgphAmfLrB6tLJZoJZoOqWi7Kw4aZjo17PrTJYph3lzRDIap4BSogY4ttKL
Fingerprint: b6:9a:76:cd:f6:33:85:1b:31:6d:2a:22:47:ca:9b:01
```

TOTAL RESULTS

1,871

TOP CITIES

Milan	218
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Naples	93
Turin	51
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554	821
80	214
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View Report Browse Images View on Map

Product Spotlight: Free, Fast IP Lookups for Open Ports and Vulnerabilities using InternetDB

151.33.69.145 ppp-145-69.33-151.wind.it WIND TRE S.P.A. Italy, Turin	RTSP/1.0 200 OK CSeq: 1 Server: Hipcam RealServer/V1.0 Public: OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, SET_PARAMETER, GET_PARAMETER	2023-05-16T12:00:51.639394
95.169.71.161 host161-static.71.169.95.h ellotel.net HelloTel Telecomunicazioni srl Italy, Frosinone	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: VCS-VideoJet-Webserver Connection: keep-alive Content-Type: text/html Etag: "VJ-15-56500410-537e6590" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 2330 Date: Tue May 16 12:56:33 2023 GMT Last-Modified: Tue May 2 14:41:57 2023 GMT Set-Cookie: HcsoB=704610401a5b032b; path=/;	2023-05-16T11:56:33.250218
151.81.2.166 Wind telecomunicazioni Italy, Dalmine	RTSP/1.0 200 OK Server: TWT RTSP Server/1.0.0 CSeq: 1 Public: OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, GET_PARAMETER, SET_PARAMETER	2023-05-16T11:41:38.566588

Cliccandoci sopra



VIP X1600 B

▶ LIVEPAGE | SETTINGS

Module 1 XFM4 | Module 2 XFM4 | Module 3 XFM4 | Module 4 XFM4



View Control



Set 1 2 3 4 5 6

Digital I/O



DISINSERITO

System Log

16.05.123 14:27:00 Used ActiveX - JPEG
16.05.123 14:27:00 Register UDP - H.264
16.05.123 14:27:00 Register UDP - H.264
16.05.123 14:27:00 Register UDP - H.264
16.05.123 14:27:00 Register UDP - H.264

Event Log

16.05.123 14:27:01 Video loss alarm 3 cleared.
16.05.123 14:27:01 Video loss alarm 4 cleared.

Help on this page?

Camera 1 | Camera 2 | Camera 3 | Camera 4 | Quad View



Stream 1 | Stream 2 | M-JPEG

Screenshot



Italy, Santa Maria a Vico

AXIS M1054 Network Camera

2023-05-12T23:35:53.132605

213.26.137.250
host-213-26-137-250.business.telecomitalia.it
HVF S.R.L

Italy, Santa Maria A
Vico



HTTP/1.0 200 OK
X-Frame-Options: sameorigin
Content-Length: 5716
Last-Modified: Fri, 12 May 2023 23:46:24 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: text/html

Residence - Hall




Stream profile

Motion JPEG ▾

Light




Audio clip



Residence - Hall



Italy, Santa Maria a Vico



// LAST SEEN: 2023-05-12

General Information

Hostnames **host-213-26-137-250.business.telecomitalia.it**

Domains **TELECOMITALIA.IT**

Country **Italy**

City **Santa Maria A Vico**

Organization **HVF S.R.L**

ISP **Telecom Italia S.p.A.**

ASN **AS3269**

Open Ports

8002 8003 8009 8010 8443

// 8002 / TCP

-150527987 | 2023-05-01T13:53:12.644791

Apache httpd 2.4.55

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 01 May 2023 14:03:05 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.55 (Unix) OpenSSL/1.1.1t
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
Upgrade: h2
Connection: Upgrade
Last-Modified: Tue, 05 Apr 2011 23:00:00 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 87
Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
```

Italy, Catania

151.54.17.113

WIND TRE S.P.A.

Italy, Catania

2023-05-12T23:21:29.574244

RTSP/1.0 200 OK

CSeq: 1

Server: Hipcam RealServer/V1.0

Public: OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, SET_PARAMETER, GET_PARAMETER



Italy, Florence

95.251.247.201

host-95-251-247-201.retai
l.telecomitalia.it

Telecom Italia S.p.A.

Italy, Florence

RTSP/1.0 200 OK

CSeq: 1

Server: Hipcam RealServer/V1.0

Public: OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, SET_PARAMETER, GET_PARAMETER

2023-04-28T12:56:34.928656



Italy, Florence (Castiglioncello, Porto turistico Cala de' Medici)

 **Banchine** 

79.135.52.133
79-135-52-133.ip.welcome
italia.it

[Vianova S.p.A](#)

 Italy, Florence

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Cache-Control: no-cache

2023-04-26T18:43:43.644142



Italy, Florence (Castiglioncello, Porto turistico Cala de' Medici)

MOBOTIX M12 Banchine

Porto Turistico Cala de' Medici

2023-05-15 CEST 11:49:40



Camera Live Image



Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)

- NIST NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
 - <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search> ←
- CISA
 - <https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>
- FIRST
 - <https://www.first.org/epss/> and here
 - https://www.first.org/epss/data_stats



VULNERABILITIES

Search Vulnerability Database

Try a product name, vendor name, CVE name, or an OVAL query.

NOTE: Only vulnerabilities that match ALL keywords will be returned, Linux kernel vulnerabilities are categorized separately from vulnerabilities in specific Linux distributions.

Search results will only be returned for data that is populated by NIST or from source of Acceptance Level "Provider".

Search Type
 Basic Advanced

Results Type
 Overview Statistics

Keyword Search

 Exact Match

Search Type
 All Time Last 3 Months

Contains HyperLinks
 CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
 US-CERT Technical Alerts
 US-CERT Vulnerability Notes
 OVAL Queries

webcam

VULNERABILITIES

SEARCH AND STATISTICS

Search Results (Refine Search)

Search Parameters:

- Results Type: Overview
- Keyword (text search): webcam
- Search Type: Search All
- CPE Name Search: false

There are **49** matching records.
 Displaying matches **1** through **20**.

Sort results by: Publish Date Descending

1 2 3 > >>

Vuln ID	Summary	CVSS Severity
CVE-2021-45345	Buffer Overflow vulnerability found in En3rgy WebcamServer v.0.5.2 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the WebcamServer.exe file. Published: maggio 10, 2023; 4:15:09 PM -0400	V3.x:(not available) V2.0:(not available)
CVE-2023-0365	The React Webcam WordPress plugin through 1.2.0 does not validate and escape some of its shortcode attributes before outputting them back in a page/post where the shortcode is embed, which could allow users with the contributor role and above to perform Stored Cross-Site Scripting attacks. Published: marzo 20, 2023; 12:15:12 PM -0400	V3.1: 5.4 MEDIUM V2.0:(not available)
CVE-2023-1188	A vulnerability was found in FabulaTech Webcam for Remote Desktop 2.8.42. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is the function 0x222018 in the library ftwebcam.sys of the component IoControlCode Handler. The manipulation leads to denial of service. The attack needs to be	V3.1: 5.5 MEDIUM V2.0:(not available)



Una nuova forma di abuso....

What is tech abuse?

Internet-connected 'smart' technologies including laptops, tablets, smartphones, home assistants (such as Alexa), smart watches and internet-connected home security systems are becoming increasingly popular in everyday life. These devices, together with the networks and services they connect to, are often referred to as [the Internet of Things \(IoT\)](#). It is difficult to predict the growth of the IoT, however, one estimate predicts the number of IoT devices worldwide [will reach 125 billion in 2030](#). While connected devices offer many potential benefits, such as greater convenience and improved home security, they also provide tools that [can facilitate domestic abuse](#).

Perpetrators of domestic abuse may misuse technology in a variety of ways to monitor, harass, threaten, impersonate, intimidate and stalk victims. This is commonly [referred to as 'tech abuse'](#). The [scale of tech abuse is not fully understood](#), however, domestic abuse charity Refuge reported that 72% of women who accessed its services in 2019 [identified being subjected to tech abuse](#). Most victims experience tech abuse alongside other types of domestic abuse, such as physical violence and sexual abuse.



POST

[UK Parliament](#) > [POST](#) > [Rapid response](#) > Technology and domestic abuse

Rapid response

Technology and domestic abuse

Published Friday, 13 November, 2020

Rapid response

Crime and justice

Digital tech

Health and social care

COVID-19

[Lorna Christie](#) [Susie Wright](#)



Gender and IoT Research Report

The rise of the Internet of Things and implications for technology-facilitated abuse



November 2018

Leonie Tanczer
Isabel Lopez Neira
Simon Parkin
Trupti Patel
George Danezis




CRIME

How your smart home devices can be turned against you



(Image credit: Getty Images)




By Alex Riley 12th May 2020



IoT: futuro e prospettive

• Rete 5G, 6G,..

- più velocità di comunicazione
- più dispositivi connessi
- maggiore affidabilità




• Intelligenza Artificiale

- auto-apprendimento
- autonomia dei sistemi IoT
- interazione in linguaggio naturale



• Edge Computing

- elaborazione locale dei dati
- beneficio in termini di privacy e sicurezza
- riduzione della latenza di comunicazione
- scalabilità e flessibilità



Siamo destinati ad essere supinamente monitorati, osservati, spiati,, giudicati ?

È possibile ridurre le nostre “tracce digitali” (la nostra ombra digitale)?



Sempre che siamo davvero interessati a farlo?

.... Nel 2019 concludevo il mio talk:

- Adozione e diffusione di tecnologie e applicazioni IoT in fortissima crescita
- **Crescente numero di produttori e di prodotti IoT**
- Estremamente complesso un controllo accurato della rispondenza tra quanto proposto sul mercato e le necessarie garanzie in termini di privacy e sicurezza che garantiscano i consumatori





IDENTIFYING EMERGING CYBER SECURITY THREATS AND CHALLENGES FOR 2030

MARCH 2023

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3.4 HUMAN ERROR AND EXPLOITED LEGACY SYSTEMS WITHIN CYBER-PHYSICAL ECOSYSTEMS - #4

In 2030, IoT permeates large parts of transport, power and water grids, and industrial infrastructure to increase efficiency and improve intelligent decision-making. Furthermore, we will see a significant increase in the number of smart devices the average user has associated to them (as of 2021, the average person had seven smart devices).¹⁸ Because of this, it may become exceedingly difficult to maintain and manage all devices, especially from a security perspective. Additionally, the manufacturers of the smart devices will likely be unsuccessful on educating end-users of the need for device maintenance. The fast adoption of IoT and the ongoing skill shortage will lead to a lack of knowledge, training and understanding of the cyber-physical ecosystem by 2030, leading to IT and OT security maintenance issues arising from the misconfiguration, delayed maintenance, and inadequate end-of-life support of discontinued IoT software. In addition to these issues, threat actors may deploy intelligent attacks using techniques such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN), which may dramatically reduce the detection rate of cyberattacks. One example of the use of GAN would be to target servers distributing patches in order to disrupt scheduled updates¹⁹. Because of the criticality of the devices, this can create a systemic risk, leading to outages, damage as well as the interception of data between the devices.

Ora ci si mette anche l'Intelligenza Artificiale.....



On the end user side, IoT devices are often managed by mobile devices running on iOS or Android. The end-users communicate through their mobile applications with the smart devices that are part of their home, transport or other surrounding. Adversaries can try to get initial access to the mobile devices by biometric spoofing, brute force attacks, or exploiting vulnerabilities on the device. Once they have access to the phone and the legitimate communication channels between the end-user phone and the infrastructure, they can tamper with the smart devices, laterally move to the network or get access to the account that manages the smart devices.²⁰ In an industrial ecosystem, adversaries could get initial access through employees by social engineering attack or through their endpoints, move laterally within the corporate network and look for internet accessible devices that are connected to the industrial control systems. Additionally, attacks could succeed through transient cyber assets that are deployed with an insecure configuration – including those from third party suppliers and partners.

Ora ci si mette anche l'Intelligenza Artificiale.....



D.1.3 Scenario 3 – More data, less control

The massive collection and use of data is driving innovation and decisions in all sectors. Important data-driven decisions that impact people's lives, livelihoods, and the natural environment are automated in 2030. The delegation of tasks to automated decision-making systems with little or no human intervention enables new solutions and improves overall efficiency. On the other side, society, and especially sectors like the medical diagnostics sector, the industry of autonomous vehicles, and financial institutes (to issue loans and credit cards) are fighting ethical challenges. Data-based and automated decision-making could lead to discriminatory and biased outcomes, privacy violations, and the undermining of human self-determination.

(IoT) devices are the predominant vehicle for decision-making data. In 2030, organizations using these devices face problems with patch management; it is especially difficult for critical infrastructure⁶⁴ providers to update the large number of devices without disruptions or breaches.

With the increasing use of digital products and services, more personal or sensitive data is available on the Internet. This data includes biometric, genetic, and behavioral information and is tracked across different online platforms. Unfortunately, data breaches, attacks, and online bullying have become part of daily life and impact most EU citizens. This results in a severe public health risk; victims struggle with PTSD, burnout, anxiety, depression, abuse, or even suicidal behavior. More and more EU consumers are concerned about how their data is being used online and are calling for increased control over data access and usage rights.



Meditate gente, meditate.....

